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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This dispute arises from the Dysfuntian civil war between Restonian and
Cascadian militias, resulting in the creation of Reston (Respondent)-a
developing State-and Cascadia (not party to the case). Annolay (Applicant)-
a neighboring State-remained neutral during the war and offered its services
for a peace conference.
In April 1997, WRI reported that Restonian militiamen were systematically
raping Cascadian women. This was confirmed by a UNCHR mission, which
found that Raskolnikov, the Restonian militia leader, and his deputies took no
steps to stop the rapes. In 1998, Raskolnikov admitted his knowledge of the
rapes and that he was powerless to stop them.
In 1999, the militias agreed to a cease-fire. On 14 September, Dysfunctia
partitioned, and on November 1st, Reston held its first elections. Raskolnikov,
President elect, granted a comprehensive amnesty to everyone in Reston
accused of wartime crimes as part of his "National Healing Campaign".
The WRI Executive Director campaigned for the adoption by Annolaysian
parents of children left orphaned by the war. ARAS arranged for parents to
attend interviews in Reston to qualify for and receive foreign adoption certifi-
cates, and nearly 2000 children were adopted.
In January 2001, the ITP revealed that Restonian border officials were
exacting bribes from adoptive parents. The officials kept these amounts. On
February 2, Annolaysian President Contrary urged Raskolnikov to address the
corruption. Raskolnikov replied that it was a small issue, and that Annolay was
complicit in the children's illegal removal. Upon further pressure, Reston reas-
signed 10 border officials accused of corruption-10% of those implicated.
None were prosecuted or disciplined.
On March 21, 2001, Contrary expressed concern about the wartime rapes
of Cascadian women, and urged Cascadia and Reston to punish the perpetrators
and pay reparations to victims. On March 31, 2001, Raskolnikov reminded
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Annolay of the amnesty, denying that his government owed any reparations. On
April 20, 2001, given its neighbors' failure to pursue the matter, Contrary stated
that Annolay would take up the cause and seek reparations for the women.
On December 1999, the UNCHR estimated that thousands of raped women
lived without families or means of support. Reports indicate that in September
of that year agents of the Schmandefare Co.-an Annolaysian private company
founded by Fred Schmandefare (Annolaysian, and company CEO)-traveled
to Cascadia to recruit hundreds of these women to find new lives in Annolay.
They were promised jobs and education, and were assisted in filing work and
travel documentation. Once in Annolay, nearly all began working in the Com-
pany's brothels. By December 2000, over 2,500 Cascadian women had been
relocated to Annolay, which granted them resident status. According to the ITP,
Schmandefare organized their recruitment and transportation to Annolay.
On 1 May 2001, ILSA published a report focusing on Cascadian women
working in Schmandefare's brothels, alleging that many were abused and
deprived of their liberty, and that Annolaysian agencies had dismissed women's
complaints. The Report provided a detailed account of a Cascadian rape victim
living in the brothels, who was subject to harsh living and working conditions.
On May 17, 2001, Contrary expressed shock and horror at this, and announced
the creation of a blue-ribbon panel to examine the problem. She denied
Annolay's responsibility for the brothels' operation, and her government's
independent knowledge of the facts in the report. She expressed her concern for
the Cascadian women, yet affirmed that the Report was insufficient basis for
criminal charges. She recognized that although complaints had been filed, the
government was not involved in the abuse of Cascadian women.
On 19 May, 2001, Raskolnikov ordered his Justice Minister to perform an
investigation on human rights violations in Annolay. Later that day, the Justice
Ministry announced that it would prosecute Schmandefare for trafficking in
women for sexual slavery based on the universal jurisdiction principle applic-
able to crimes against humanity. It is the first time that Reston invokes univer-
sal jurisdiction. Reston announced that it would try him in absentia if jurisdic-
tion was not obtained, and requested Schmandefare through diplomatic
channels. There is no extradition treaty between Annolay and Reston.
The following day Contrary accused Raskolnikov of trying to distract
attention from his country's problems, denying the commission of a crime
against humanity and Reston's right to exercise universal jurisdiction. She
requested that Reston respect Annolay's sovereignty.
On 21 May 2001, Raskolnikov released copies of the ILSA Report's
unpublished background research, which indicated that the Schmandefare Co.
operated dozens of brothels. Raskolnikov reiterated Reston's intention to try
Schmandefare under the universality principle.
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Following unsuccessful mediation by the UNSG, the parties agreed to
submit their differences to the ICJ. Contrary has ordered Schmandefare not to
leave the country, pending the judgment of the Court.
IE. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Annolay and Reston have submitted by Special Agreement their differ-
ences concerning the women and children of the Dysfunctian civil war and
related matters, and transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court
pursuant to article 40(1) of the Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted
the jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute.
ImI. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
The Court should declare that Reston has breached its international obliga-
tions and must pay damages to Annolay to be distributed to victims of systema-
tic rape during the Dysfunctian civil war now resident in Annolay. Annolay has
standing since it can exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the victims
based on the effective link doctrine. In any case, since the rapes constitute war
crimes in violation of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or,
at least acts of torture, Annolay has standing because Reston breached these
erga omnes obligations. Reston's responsibility arises from the attribution of
the acts of the Restonian militia to the new State of Reston because of the
continuity of the organization of the militia and that of the new State, as well as
from Reston's subsequent ultimate default to prosecute and punish the
perpetrators of such criminal acts through the granting of a comprehensive
amnesty. Indeed, the granting of amnesty for gross violations of human rights
is rejected under customary law.
Reston is in breach of its international obligations with respect to the bribes
exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian citizens, and is obligated to pay
restitution in the amount of the bribes. Annolay's claim is not barred by the
clean-hands doctrine, since the damage was not due to the sole fault of the
parents, nor were the parents required to exhaust local remedies as such
remedies would be futile. Reston is responsible for the bribes due to its failure
to enact anti-bribery legislation-which defeats the object and purpose of the
RACC-and as a result of not prosecuting and punishing the corrupt border
officials. Furthermore, by not preventing the improper financial gain of those
officials involved, Reston breached customary obligations set out in the CRC
regarding adoption, which directly relate to the Best Interest of the Child
Principle.
Reston is not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare,
as it intends, since the only available evidence of a crime against humanity
subject to universal jurisdiction are press articles and NGO reports, which are
insufficient to establish a primafacie case of Schmandefare's guilt. Moreover,
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the contextual elements required of crimes against humanity are not met because
Schmandefare was acting in his private capacity without instigation from any
State or organization, and the attack was not directed against a specific civilian
population. Reston is also barred from exercising universal jurisdiction, as the
universality principle has not gained customary status. Additionally, trials in
absentia are forbidden under international law, as evidenced by State practice.
Moreover, trying Schmandefare in absentia without proper notice clearly
breaches his right to due process, specifically to be present at trial. Finally,
since Reston's assertion of universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare is retalia-
tory to Annolay' s purpose of seeking reparation for the war victims, it is in bad
faith.
Annolay has not breached any international legal obligations deriving from
the alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in Annolay, and
in any event, Reston has no standing to enforce such obligations. Indeed, the
obligations relating to trafficking have not acquired erga omnes status, hence
Reston, as it is not an injured State, cannot invoke Annolay's responsibility.
Alternatively, Annolay is not responsible for the treatment of the Cascadian
women since customary law does not provide Reston any grounds for enforcing
the obligation to prevent and punish trafficking upon Annolay, due to the lack
of consistent State practice. Also, the creation of the investigatory panel
evidences Annolay's diligence in the matter.
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Reston has breached its international obligations and must pay
damages to be distributed as reparations to those victims of systematic rape
during the Dysfunctian civil war now resident in Annolay;
2. Whether Reston is in breach of its international obligations with respect to
the bribes exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian citizens and is
obligated to pay restitution in the amount of the bribes to Annolay on
behalf of the Annolaysian adoptive parents;
3. Whether Reston in entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Mr. Fred
Schmandefare; and
4. Whether Annolay has breached any international legal obligations deriving
from the alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in
Annolay, and whether Reston has standing to enforce such obligations.
V. PLEADINGS
Reston has breached its obligations and must pay damages to Annolay to be
distributed as reparations to those victims of systematic rape during the
Dysfunctian Civil War who are now resident in Annolay.
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A. Annolay Has Standing To Bring This Claim Before the Court.
Although in principle States can exercise diplomatic protection only on
behalf of nationals,' a progressive reading of Nottebohm can extend such pro-
tection to residents. In resolving which State could exercise diplomatic protec-
tion on Nottebohm's behalf, residence was used as a link between Nottebohm
and the State to determine his nationality. 2  Although the women are not
Annolaysians, they came into Annolay as Dysfunctians, a State that ceased to
exist; Cascadia declined its right to exercise this claim; and they were victims
of gross human rights violations deserving reparation. Hence, their State of
residence, the only one with which they have an effective link, should be
allowed to step forward. Thus, Annolay requests this Court to innovate towards
a more reasonable approach and allow Annolay to bring this claim on behalf of
its Cascadian residents. Alternatively, States other than the injured State may
invoke the responsibility of another for breaches of obligations erga omnes.3
As proven below, Reston's conduct breaches two erga omnes rules: the pro-
hibition against war crimes4 and the prohibition against torture,5 hence Annolay
has standing to bring this claim.
B. The Rapes Of The Cascadian Women Breached Erga Omnes Obligations.
Although the widespread and presumably systematic nature of the rapes
may qualify them as crimes against humanity, Reston's responsibility arises
more clearly from the commission of war crimes and/or torture. Thus, Annolay
will base this claim on said arguments.
1. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. 1, (ser. A/B), at 357 (Feb. 28); Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 2562nd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (2001), art. 4;
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 406 (5th ed. Clarendo Press Oxford 1998).
2. See Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech.v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
3. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 48(1)(b),
INT'L L. COMM'N, 56th Sess., G.A. Supp No. 10, U.N. Doc A/56/83 (2001); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 208 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub.1995); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); THERON MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 191 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 68 (1996); LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 245
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002); MERON, supra note 3, at 227.
5. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16, 1998, No. IT-96-21-T, Trial, 454; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Feb.
22, 2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 466, at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/triac2/judgement/kun-
tj010222e.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d. 699, (9th Cir. 1992);
Mary Griffin, Ending the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Atrocities: A Major Challenge for
International Law in the 21st Century, 838 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 369-389 (2000); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW ON THE UNITED STATES § 70 (1987).
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1. The Rapes of the Cascadian Women were War Crimes.
An act is a war crime when: (i) it breaches a customary rule of internation-
al humanitarian law that protects important values, involving grave consequen-
ces for the victims; and (ii) said rule entails individual criminal responsibility
under customary law.6 The rapes of Cascadian women constitute war crimes.
a. The rapes breached a customary rule of humanitarian law protecting
important values.
Common Article 3, which applies to all armed conflicts7 (including internal
wars between groups without government involvement or where the State
ceases to exist)8 is custom,9 as evidenced from State practice deriving from the
creation of international criminal tribunals, whose case-law has applied this rule
as custom.'0 Opiniojuris follows from the widespread acceptance of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, regarded as customary law,"' and UN Resolutions calling
for respect of human rights and humanitarian law, including Common Article
3, in all armed conflicts. 2 Additionally, a breach of Common Article 3 requires
6. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Nov. 2, 2001, No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 123; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Oct. 2, 1995, No. IT-94-1-T, Defense Motion on Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 94; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Mar. 24, 2000, No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 1 20, at www.un.org/icty/lalekovski/appeal/
judgmentale-asj000324e.pdf. (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
7. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 218 (June 27).
8. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.JV/1 1.95, doe. 7 rev. 271 (1997),
[ 152; DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 48 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1999); Daniel ThUrer, The "Failed State" and International Law, 836 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS,
731-61 (2001).
9. MERON, supra note 3, 227-28; Kelly D. Askdn, Women and International Humanitarian Law,
in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 55 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds. Trans-
national Pub. Inc. 1998); Kathleen M. Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for International
Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, BERKELEY WOMEN' S L.J., Note
85 (1994).
10. Prosecutor v. Bla[ki], Mar. 3, 2000, No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 1 166; Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Sept. 2, 1998, No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 1608; Prosecutor v. Tadic, May 7 1997, No. 1T-94- 1-T, Opinion
and Judgement, 557; Prosecutor v. Tadic, July 15, 1999, No. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, Judgement,
613.
11. Legality Of The Threat Or Use Of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 8, (July 8) (Advisory Opinion)
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons], at http://www.dfat.gov.au/intorgs/icj nuc/unan5a a.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2003); STEvEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATTROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 82 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
12. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 3138th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/778 (1992); S.C. Res. 794, U.N.
SCOR, 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/794 (1992); S.C. Res 814, U.N. SCOR, 318th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/814 (1993); S.C. Res. 972, U.N. SCOR, 3489th mtg. at, U.N. Doe. S/RES/972 (1995); S.C. Res. 1001,
U.N. SCOR, 3549th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1001 (1995); Declaration on Respect for Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 18, at 164, U.N. Doc. A17433 (1968);
Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, U.N.G.A., 25th Sess., 1922nd
mtg., G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV) (1970).
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(i) that the victims be "protected persons" (i. e,. not taking part in the hostili-
ties); and (ii) that a nexus exist between the offence and the armed conflict.' 3
In this case, (i) no evidence points to the victims' taking part in the hostilities,
thus they were protected persons; and (ii) according to UNCHR and WRI
reports, which are admissible evidence, 4 the rapes were systematic and intended
to coerce the Cascadian population, which proves their nexus to the war. Thus,
the rapes breached Common Article 3.
Second, Common Article 3 implicitly prohibits rape, 5 as rape constitutes
cruel treatment under general principles of law, 16 and can also take the form of
torture, 7 as did the rapes of the Cascadian women (as proven infra). Accord-
ingly, Common article 3 protects important values, since it reflects elementary
considerations of humanity, 8 and protects rights recognized in major human
rights instruments. Moreover, the rapes entailed grave consequences for
victims, as rape inflicts severe physical and psychological suffering, 9 and the
Cascadian women endured ostracism, unemployment, and loss of family and
friends.
b. The breach of Common Article 3 entails individual criminal
responsibility.
International criminal courts prosecute breaches of Common Article 3
under the idea that they entail individual criminal responsibility,2" a notion
13. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, June 7, 2001, No. ICTR-95-1 A-T, Judgement, 103; Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Oct. 2 1995, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1 -T, 614-15; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Nov. 2, 2001, No.
IT-98-30/1-T, (H 123-24; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Feb. 22, 2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 407.
14. Corfu Channel, 1948 I.C.J. 4, Prelim. Obj. 15 18 (Mar. 25); Velazquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Final Draft Text of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1,
Rule 63 (2000).
15. Askin, supra note 9, at 56; Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in
International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L L REV. 1, 115-16
(1999).
16. M. CHERtIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANiKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 574-75 (Transnational Pub. 1996).
17. Christin B. Coan, Comment, Rethinking the Spoils of War: Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime
in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 183, 205-
10 (2000); Rhonda Copelon, Symposium, Women's Rights as International Human Rights: Women and War
Crimes, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 61 (1995); Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, International Criminal Law
and the ICC Statute, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15 (Transnational Pub. 2000).
18. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 218.
19. Evelyn Mary Aswald, Torture by Means of Rape, GEO. L.J. 1932 (1996); Christine Chinkin,
Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (1994); Tadic, No. IT-94-I-T,
91612.
20. Prosecutor v. Delalic (AElebici Case), Feb. 20, 2001, No. IT-96-21 -A, Appeal, 153; Prosecutor
v. Kunarac, Feb. 22, 2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/1 -T, 1408; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Feb. 26, 2001, No.
95-14/2-T, 1 168.
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supported by States.2' Moreover, international law has developed towards the
criminalization of breaches of Common Article 3, as acts perpetrated in internal
conflicts cannot be treated more leniently than those committed in international
conflicts.2 Thus, since both elements required for acts to constitute war crimes
are met, the rapes constitute war crimes.
2. Alternatively, The Rapes Constitute Acts of Torture.
International criminal tribunals have relied on human rights instruments to
define torture,2 3 which can be committed by non-state actors in some circum-
stances.24 The elements of torture are: (i) the intentional infliction of severe
pain; (ii) for the purpose of, inter alia, intimidating or coercing the victim or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination; (iii) with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or someone acting in official capacity. As
stated supra, rape is a form of torture, specially when committed systematically
and for political purposes.25 In armed conflict, rape inherently entails coercive
or discriminatory purposes. 6 This case was no exception: UNCHR and WRI
reports characterized the rapes as systematic and deliberately used to spread
terror among the Cascadian population. Moreover, rape victims endure a high
degree of suffering, as stated supra. Therefore, the first two elements of torture
are met. The third element is also present, since officials of non-state organizat-
ions or groups seeking political control over a territory, and non-state parties to
an internal conflict, such as Restonian militia, act in official capacity.27 Thus,
the rapes constituted torture.
21. Statement by French Representative, Sec. Council, 3217th mtg., at 11, UN Doe. S/PV.3217
(1993); U.S. Gov't Submission Concerning Certain Arguments by the Council for the Accused in Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Oct. 2, 1995, No. rT-94-1-T, 35-36; EU Joint Statement No. 11, at 102 (1992); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, UN Doec. A/Conf. 183/9, art 8.2(c) (2002) [hereinafter ICC], at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/stattue/romefra.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
22. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16, 1998, No. IT-96-21-A at 300; R. Degni-Sequi, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, C.H.R Res. S-3/l., 51 st Sess., U.N. Doec. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994) 154;
Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 561 (1995).
23. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10, 1998, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1 160; Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A
1459; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Sept. 2, 1998, No. ICTR-96-4-T, 459; MOIR, supra note 4, at 201.
24. H.L.R. v. France, 11/1996/630/813, Eur. Ct. H.R. at40 (1997); Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-
23/1-T 911 408, 496.
25. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Reports of the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, OEA/Ser.IJV/IL88, doec. 10
rev. 134 (1995); Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 198 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds. 2000).
26. Delalic, No. IT-96-2 I -T 1 495-96.
27. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 119; Barbara Coechrane Alexander, Convention Against
Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L REV. 895,
920 (2000); Delalic, No. IT-96-21 -T 1 473.
2003] Distinguished Brief
The prohibition against torture in Common Article 3 constitutes an
elementary consideration of humanity which must be respected in all armed
conflicts,28 due to the need to ensure respect for certain human rights and
humanitarian norms, minimum humanitarian standards, in all circumstances.
Elementary considerations of humanity bind all States as principles of law. a°
Thus, the prohibition against torture should have been respected during the Dys-
fuctian war.
C. Reston is Responsible for Breaching Obligations in Connection with the
Rapes.
Internationally wrongful acts of States, which occur when conduct is
attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of its international obligations 3
entail their responsibility. 32 A State's international responsibility can arise from
an ultimate default to prosecute and punish internationally injurious acts of its
nationals.3 Such default results from the pardon of an offence, for this causes
a State to deprive itself of the possibility to punish a crime under international
law.34 Particularly, granting amnesties for war crimes breaches international
human rights law and undermines principles enshrined in UN Resolutions. 5
28. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 218; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity,
and Dictates of Public Conscience, AM. J. INT'L. L. 82 (2000); The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 8 (Jul. 8 1996) (Shahabuddeen, dissenting Op.).
29. Minimum Humanitarian Standards, C.H.R. Res. 1997/21, U.N. ESCOR, 56th mtg., Supp. No.
3, at 88, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1997/21 (1997); Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to C.H.R.
Decision 2001/112, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental Standards of Humanity,
C.H.R. Res. 2000/69, 58th Sess., E/CN.4/2002/103 (2001) para. 3.
30. Corfu Channel, 1948 I.C.J. 15 158; Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 8 79.
31. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
at art. 2; Case Concerning Phosphates in Morocco, (Italy v. Fr.) 1938 P.C.I.J. 4, (ser. A/B), No. 74, at 10 (June
14); Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24) 56; Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project, (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 78 (Sept.
25) 1 66.
32. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
art. 1; SS Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. 1, (ser. A) No. 5, at 178 (Aug. 17); Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. 21
(ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (Judgment); Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.LJ. (ser. A) No. 9, at 29 (Sept.
1928).
33. Short v. Iran, 16 Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 83, 83-85 (1987); Case of the Montijo, (U.S. v. Col.),
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 2 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S.
HAS BEEN A PARTY, 1439 (1874), Janes Claim, (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (1926) [hereinafter Janes Claim];
Parker Massey, US-Mex Gral. Cl. Comm., No. C166, (1927).
34. West, US-Mex. Gral. Cl. Comm., No. (1927).
35. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10, 1998, IT-95-17/l-T, 155; Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, U.N. G.A. Res. 40/34, 96th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
40/34 (1985); Principles of International Cooperation in the Detention, Arrest Extradition, and Punishment
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. G.A. Res. 3047 (XXVIII), Dec. 3, 1973,
(1973).
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Indeed, States have an obligation to prosecute and punish gross violations of
human rights, which include acts of torture.36 Moreover, despite UN reluctance
to reject general amnesties, as in the case concerning Haiti,37 the state of the law
evolves towards the contrary. Indeed, in the more recent case of Sierra Leone,
the UN affirmed that it did not recognize amnesty for war crimes and other
serious violations of international law.38 Thus, Reston's granting of amnesty
breaches its obligation to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the crime,
giving rise to its responsibility.
D. Reston Must Pay Damages.
States entitled to invoke another State's responsibility for breaches of erga
omnes obligations may claim reparation in the interest of the beneficiaries of
said obligation.39 Hence, Annolay can claim reparations for the Cascadian
women, specifically compensation due when a wronged situation cannot be
reestablished to the conditions that existed before the wrongful act was
committed.4" Here, the situation cannot be reestablished, since the women's
physical and psychological suffering cannot be undone. Thus, considering that
compensation has been awarded before, both for physical and moral damage,4'
Annolay requests that the Court order Reston payment to be distributed among
the rape victims now resident in Annolay.
Reston is in breach of its international obligations with repsect to the bribes
exacted by its border officials from Annolaysian citizens, and is obligated to pay
36. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, annexed to GA Res. 39/46, 39 GAOR, Supp. No. 51, 197 U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1987), art. 12,
13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1976), art. 7 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Inter-Am. Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (1987), art. 1; Case 10.150, O.A.S. Ann. Rep. on Suriname, O.A.S/ser.L./V/H.77; William
W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis ofAmnesty
Legislation, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 479 (2001).
37. Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There A Duty To Prosecute International
Crimes in Haiti, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996).
38. U.N. DAILY PRESS BRIEFING OF OFFICE OF SPOKESMAN FOR SEC. GEN., July 5-7, 1999, available
at http://www.un.org/News/briefing/docs/1999/19990707.DB070799.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); 13
AFRICA RECOVERY 2-3, Sept. 8, 1999.
39. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
at art. 48(2)(b).
40. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INT'L LAW 14 (Clarendon Press Oxford 1987);
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 44 (Oxford Univ. Press1999); Ian Brownlie,
Remedies in the ICJ, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 565 (Vaughan Lowe &
Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
41. I'm Alone, (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 44, 1618 (1949) (1933); Spanish Zone of Morocco (Spain
v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A., ii, 615 (1925); The Rainbow Warrior Incident, 19 R.I.A.A. 202 (1986); Norwegian
Shipowners' Claim, 1 R.I.A.A. 309 (1922); Maal Case, 10 R.I.A.A. 731 (1903).
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restitution in the amount of the bribes to Annolay on behalf of the Annolaysian
adoptive parents.
A. Annolay's Claim Is Not Barred By The Clean-Hands Doctrine.
A claimant's involvement in illegal activities may bar his claim, thus the
clean-hands doctrine can be invoked as basis for rejecting a claim of diplomatic
protection.42 Accordingly, Reston may argue that Annolaysian parents were, by
paying the bribes- involved themselves in corruption and have "dirty hands."
However, said argument must be dismissed. Indeed, the value of "clean-hands"
is highly questionable, since it has been rarely applied. 3 The doctrine succeeds
only where the breach by the victim was the sole cause of her damage, that is,
where the cause-and-effect relationship between the damage and the victim's
conduct involved no wrongful act by the respondent State. 4 However, the
corruption of the Restonian officials was a quid pro quo, involving no sole fault
since, as with any case of corruption, someone paid and someone was paid.45
Consequently, the clean-hands doctrine does not apply.
B. Furthermore, Annolaysian Parents Need Not Exhaust Local Remedies.
Reston may also argue that Annolaysian parents should have sought
redress in Reston before Annolay could bring the case to the ICJ. Nevertheless,
in this case exceptions to the exhaustion of local remedies rule apply: first, the
requirement is exonerated where local remedies do not exist;46 second, local
remedies need not be exhausted whenever they are futile.47 In this case, (i)
42. Eastern Greenland Case, April 5, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Dissenting Op.);
Diversion of Water from the Meuse, (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 172 (June 28); JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, 3 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U. S. HAS
BEEN A PARTY, 2738-39 (1898) [hereinafter Clarke Claim]; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCtPLES OF LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 156 (Cambridge Grotius Pub. Ltd. 1987).
43. Report ofthe International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 173, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10.
at 191, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (1999); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 218 at 14 392-94.
44. Report of the International Law Commission, Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. G.A,
at 49, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2 (1999); Salmon, (Des 'mains propres' comme Condition de
Recevabilit), A.F.D.I. 249 (1964); GARCIA ARIAS, LA DOCTRINE DES "CLEAN HANDS" EN DROrr INTER-
NACIONAL PUBLIC, ANNUAIRE A.A.D.I. 18 (1960).
45. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
REFORM 93 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
46. Altesor v. Uruguay, 70 LLR. 248 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. R.2/10 1982); Exception to the
Exhaustion of Local Remedies, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OC-1 1 (1990); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PEACE INTRODUCTION AND PART 1 525, (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds. 9th ed., Longman 1996).
47. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 1, at art. 14(a); Finnish Shipowners' Arbi-
tration, (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.LA.A. 1479 (1934); Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989
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evidently there are no remedies available in Reston, since the non-existence of
specific anti-bribery laws in that State makes it impossible for Annolaysians to
charge the officials for bribery under Restonian criminal law; and (ii) remedies
are obviously futile in a State that showed the most flagrant tolerance towards
corruption, not only by its lack of anti-bribery laws, but by considering that the
mere reassignment of officials, while none have been disciplined or prosecuted,
was enough to solve the problem, and furthermore by its President's declaration
regarding the corruption problem as a small issue undeserving his immediate
attention; a stand that contradicts most States' view of corruption as an inter-
national crime that threatens democracy and human rights.48 Thus, arguments
claiming non-exhaustion of local remedies should be disregarded.
C. Reston 's Conduct Entails A Breach Of Its International Obligations.
1. Reston Breached the Obligation to Enact Anti-Bribery Laws.
The customary character of the rule binding States to enact anti-bribery
laws derives from its inclusion in international instruments,49 suggesting a
pattern of State practice. Opinio juris follows from the criminalization of
bribery in most States' domestic law. ° In this case, Reston has clearly failed to
enact legislation against corruption. Furthermore, such failure entails a breach
I.C.J. 15 (July 20) [hereinafter ELSI]; C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INT'L LAW (2nd ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
48. Explanatory Report CLCC, GMC (98)40 § 11 (1998); THE PENAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 27 (1983); Henkin & Hargrove,
Enforcing Human rights Through International Criminal Law and Through an International Criminal Court
in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 347 (1994).
49. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Regional Anti-Corruption Convention), 38 I.L.M. 505,
at art. 3 [hereinafter RACC]; id. at art. 3; Inter-Am. Cony. against Corruption, March 29, 1996, art, H (1), art
VIII, available at http://www.oas.orgljuridico/english/Treaties/b-58.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003); Southern
African Development Community, Protocol Against Corruption, art. 2(a), art. 3(1)(a); Action against
Corruption, U.N.G.A., 82nd mtg, U.N. Doc A/RES/51/59 (1996); Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
Report of the Third Committee, U.N GA, 51 st Sess., Agenda item 101, U.N. Doc. A/51/610 (1996).
50. Bah: Criminal Code, § 118-23; Department of Justice Canada, Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act, c. 34 (1998); Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Corrupt Practices and
Illegal Transfer of Funds, U.N. GA, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 93(b) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/55/405 (2000); The
Prevention of Corruption Act, Central Act No. 49/1988, ch. 111 (1988), available at http://www.kar.nic.id/
lokayukta/preact.htm (last visited Sept 23, 2003); Indon: Criminal Code of Law Regarding Bribery, 1980;
Kaz: Criminal Code, art. 147, Decree on Responsibility for Corruption, 22 Dec. 1995; Libya: Economic
Crimes Law No. 2, 1979, art. 226; Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Criminal Code Act, Ch. 77 (1990); Peru:
Supreme Res. No. 160, May 27, 2001; PRC: Supplementary Regulations on Suppression of Corruption and
Bribery (1988); U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions (1977), available at
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/fcpl.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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of the object and purpose of the RACC, which Reston is bound not to defeat,51
as a signatory of the RACC, and a party to the VCLT. According to legal
experts, the object and purpose of the RACC (identical to that of the CLCC)
derives from its Preamble," which states the need to pursue, as a matter of
priority, a common criminal policy to protect society against corruption, includ-
ing the adoption of appropriate legislation.3 Accordingly, the duty of States
to enact anti-corruption legislation (and forbid bribery) is part of the object and
purpose of the RACC. Thus, Reston' s failure to enact anti-bribery laws defeats
the object and purpose of a signed treaty.
2. Reston Breached its Obligation to Establish Jurisdiction over the Bribers.
States have a general duty to exercise due diligence in the prosecution and
punishment of nationals when these have harmed nationals of other States.' As re-
gards corruption, there is a duty to assert jurisdiction over offenses committed
within their territories or by their nationals, which is a customary obligation, as
derives from its inclusion in international instruments and UN Resolutions on
corruption urging States to adopt legislation permitting prosecution of corruption,"
and its continuous application by national tribunals.56 Reston's breach of this
obligation is evidenced by three facts: first, the Restonian officials committed
passive bribery, defined as the request or receipt by any public official of an
undue advantage in order to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 18(a), 1155 U.N.T.S 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
52. Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption
Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 793 (2001); Fritz Heimann, SHOULD
FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 7 TRANSPARENCY INT'L 1994; David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee,
Symposium: Fighting International Corruption & Bribery in the 21st Century, Fighting Corruption: A
Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 595 (2000); Claire
Moore Dickerson, Political Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 393 (1999).
53. RACC, supra note 49, at Preamble; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49,
at Preamble.
54. Janes Claim, supra note, at 33; Norwegian Shipowners' Claim, I R.I.A.A. 309 (1922); (Neer
v. Mex), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, (1926) [hereinafter Neer]; Noyes Claim, 6 R.I.A.A. 308 (1933); M. SHAw,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
55. RACC, supra note 49, at art. 17; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, at art.
17; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, U.N. GAR 5 1/59, (1996), at art.
4; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 49, at art. VI; Measures against Corrupt
Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, their Intermediaries and Others Involved, U.N. GAR,
2441st mtg, 3514 (XXX) 1976; Business and Development, U.N. G.A., 96th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/106
(1995); United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GA, 55th Sess., Agenda
Item 105, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2000).
56. Berlusconi, Ital. Ct. Cass. (2001); Montesinos, Special Crim. Law Chamber (2002); Att'y
General v. Hui Kin-Hong, 1HK C.L.R 227 (CA) 299 (1995); Att'y General. v. Reid, 1 AC 324 (1994); A. G.
Ogun State v. A.G. of the Federation., 3 NCLR 166 (1982).
20031
230 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (Vol. 10:215
functions; 7 second, the State's only reaction to the rampant corruption at its
borders was to reassign a mere 10% of the individuals implicated; and third,
although no border officials were ever prosecuted or disciplined, Reston con-
sidered that the problem had been "taken care of'. Moreover, even if Reston
has no criminal anti-bribery laws, at least civil and/or administrative liability
remained possible. Therefore, Reston is responsible for the breach of the obli-
gation to establish jurisdiction over acts of corruption.
3. Reston Breached its Obligation to Prevent Improper Financial
Gain in Adoption.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) binds all States
under customary international law.58 Said status derives from its ratification by
all States, excepting Somalia and the United States (which have nevertheless
signed the CRC),59 and Reston, the only State in the world which has not even
signed the CRC. The CRC requires States to take all appropriate measures to
ensure that adoption does not result in improper financial gain for those
involved,6' a customary rule, as evidenced from the practice of States in accept-
ing its inclusion in international instruments,6 and from the opinio juris
revealed by its adoption in domestic legislation.62 Also, State practice in
57. RACC, supra note 49, at art. 3, 5; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, at
art. 3, 5; Inter-American Convention against Corruption, supra note 49, at art. VI(l)(a); Revised Draft U.N.
Convention against Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/AC.261/3 rev. 1, 24-25 (2002).
58. Cynthia Price Cohen, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Feminist
Landmark, 3 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 29 (1997); Nicole Barner Graff, Note, Intercountry Adoption and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Can the Free Market in Children Be Controlled?, 27 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 405,412 (2000); LAwRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
45 (Univ. of Nebreska Press 1995).
59. U.N. Hum. Rts. Treaties Database, Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Somalia (2002), at http://www.unhchr.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); U.N. Hum. Rts. Treaties
Database, Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.S. (1995), at
http://www.unhchr.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); UNICEF, Office of the High Commissioner for Hum. Rts.,
Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at http://www.unicef.orglcrcl
crc.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
60. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, November 20, 1989, U.N. Doc.
A44/736 (1990), an. 21(d).
61. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children,
with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, U.N. GAR, 95th
mtg., G.A. Res. 41/85, December 3, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85, an. 20; Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercounty Adoption, art. 32(1); US: Uniform
Adoption Act (1994).
62. Alb: Family Law (1992); BeIr: Family & Marriage Law (2002); Bol: C6digo del Menor
(1992); Braz: Estatuto del Menor y del Adloescente (1990); Can: Adoption Act (1993); Chile: Ley de
Adopci6n; Peru: Civil Code; Phil: Republic Act No. 8043; PRC: Order of the President of the PRC No. 10,
Adoption Law of 1999; Rom: Strategy Concerning the Protection of Children in Difficulty.
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fighting corruption in adoption is shown by cases such as Romania's, where
States have halted their international adoptions to stop related acts of corrup-
tion."
Moreover, this provision relates directly to the observance of the Best
Interest of the Child Principle,64 as the rule seeks to contribute in the fight
against baby selling and child trafficking. One case where the world has most
clearly regarded the best interest of children is where a State has suffered
internal or international conflicts, resulting in the adoption of approximately
65 o20,000 children per year, most of which come from countries with serious
difficulties (e.g., Paraguay, Colombia, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Romania, and the
Former Yugoslavia).66 In Romania, thousands came forward to adopt over
165,000 children living in inhumane conditions. 67 The case at hand is impres-
sively similar to Romania's. However, Reston allowed its officials to obtain
improper financial gain from the adoptions, even after knowing of the situation
through the publication of the "Corruption in the Nursery" articles; which
results in a breach of its international obligations.
D. Reston Is Bound To Pay Restitution.
In this case, the most adequate form of reparation is restitution of the
amounts paid to the officials. Indeed, international tribunals have awarded
restitution in a number of cases.6" Consequently, the most adequate form of
63. Update on Romanian Moratorium on InternationalAdoption, (June 2003). U. S. Dep't. of State,
Bureau of Consular Affairs Overseas Citizens Services Office of Children Issues, available at
Http://travel.state.gov/adoption-mmania.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); Romania Bans International
Adoption, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001I/WORLD/europe/06/22/romania.adoption. (last visited Oct.
4, 2003).
64. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 60, at art. 21, 21(d); Banner, supra note 58,
at 416.
65. Ahilemah Jonet, Legal Measures to Eliminate Transnational Trading of Infants for Adoption:
An Analysis ofAnti-Infant Trading Statutes in the United States, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 305 (1990);
Margaret Liu, Comment. International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 187 (1994);
Jonathan G. Stein, A Call to End Baby Selling: Why the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption Should
Be Modified to Include the Consent Provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 39
(2001); Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW 181(1996).
66. Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an End?, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 121 (1994).
67. Pollitt, Intercountry Adoption, 49-53 (1992); DAVID ROMANIA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
(1991); M. Farrow, Romanian Orphans Suffer by New Rules, Supporters Say, VANCOUVER SUN. Dec. 4, 1991,
at B5.
68. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 2 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PARTY 1449, 1466 (1898); Orinoco Company, 9 R.I.A.A. 297 (1903); Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15); Rights of Britons in
Spanish Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 615, 722 (1923).
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reparation for the Annolaysians' monetary losses is restitution in kind. How-
ever, since the parents paid the bribes, a question arises on the matter of com-
parative fault, recognized as grounds for the determination of damages.69
Indeed, international tribunals have reduced the claimant's award in proportion
to her culpability. 70 In this case, Annolay is prepared to accept that the parents
"culpability" has an effect on the determination of damages, conceding to the
following: (i) that parents who complied with all adoption requirements bear
absolutely no fault in the corruption, hence the Court should award them
restitution in the full amount; and (ii) that parents who paid bribes after failing
or without attending fitness interviews bear comparative fault, and thus Annolay
accepts any reduction in recovery deemed appropriate.
Reston is not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Mr. Fred
Schmandefare.
Under "universal jurisdiction", any State can prosecute perpetrators of
crimes that are considered heinous and harmful to mankind under the idea that
every State has a legal interest to prosecute crimes that have been universally
condemned.71 In this case, Reston has argued that it is entitled to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction over Schmandefare based on the assumption that he com-
mitted a crime against humanity. However, the argument must be dismissed.
A. Evidence Does Not Support a Prima Facie Case Of Schmandefare's
Guilt.
For this Court to assert that Reston can exercise universal jurisdiction over
Schmandefare, a prima facie case of his guilt for the crime against humanity of
sexual slavery (as affirmed by Reston) must be established. A prima facie case
is a credible case which would, if not contradicted, be sufficient legal basis to
convict the accused.72 However, in this case, the evidence does not support the
69. GARCIA AMADOR, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES
TO ALIENS 35 (1974); DE BEUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GENERAL CLAIMS COMMISSION, U.S. AND
MEXICO 312 (1938); David J. Bederman, Contributory Fault and State Responsibility, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 335
(1990).
70. Garcia & Garcia, 4 R.I.A.A. 119, 123 (1926); Kling v. Mex., 4 R.I.A.A. 575, 585 (1930); JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, 2 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S. HAS
BEEN A PARTY 1865, 1895-96 (1898).
71. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 411; CASSESE, supra note 3, at 261; Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788 (1988); BENAVIDES, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, A.M.D.I. 26 (2001).
72. Kai Ambos, Establishing an International Criminal Court and an International Criminal Code
- Observations from an International Criminal Law Viewpoint, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L (2001), available at
http://www.ejil.org/joumallVoll7No4/art4-Ol .html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
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construction of a prima facie case against Schmandefare, since close analysis
of the treatment of the Cascadian women is required, and the Compromis
contains few facts on the matter, other than ILSAs findings and ITP articles.
This information does not suffice, as NGO findings and press information have
little evidentiary value in the field of criminal law,73 in light of the requirement
of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.74 Moreover, press reports alone are
not regarded as evidence capable of proving facts.75 Thus, the ILSA report and
ITP articles do not constitute sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
of crimes against humanity.
B. Alternatively, No Crime Against Humanity Has Been Committed.
Qualification of conduct as a crime against humanity requires a stringent
test," since these are considered the gravest crimes of international concern.
Since Reston accused Schmandefare of "trafficking for the purpose of sexual
slavery" there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of the
crime against humanity of sexual slavery, which are:
(i) the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership over
persons;
(ii) the causing of persons to engage in sexual acts;
(iii) a context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population; and
the perpetrator's knowledge that his conduct is part of such an attack.77
1. Schmandefare's Conduct does not Meet the Objective
Elements of Sexual Slavery.
Reston has specifically alleged that Schmandefare's actions amount to
trafficking in women, which is one of the property rights included in this
73. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 256.
74. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 7, Rule 87(a) (1996); International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute,
SC Res. 827 (1923), art. 19(1); ICTR Statute, SC Res. 955 (1994), art. 18(1); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Nov. 16,
1998, IT-96-21-T, 601.
75. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 62.
76. Darryl Robinson, Defining Crimes Against Humanity at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 43 (1999); John L. Washburn, Convener of the American NGO Coalition on the ICC, The International
Criminal Court Arrives: Establishing an Ethic of Peace and Justice 4 (2002), 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873,
876 (2002).
77. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Addendum, Part U Finalized Draft
Text of the Elements of Crimes, Nov. 2, 2000, U.N. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2, art. 7(1)(g)- 2 [hereinafter
Elements of Crimes]; ICC, supra note 21, at art. 9.
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element.78 Trafficking involves, inter alia, the use of coercion or deception.79
As indicated in the Compromis, representatives of the Schmandefare Company
recruited women to work primarily as nannies or domestic servants, and they
voluntarily accepted to come into Annolay to work for the Schmandefare
Company, hence the women appear to have had a choice as to their work, since
not all of them ended up working in brothels, and they were all granted perm-
anent resident status, meaning that they had no legal restraints as to their
freedom of work in the country. Thus, since no coercion or deception is
evident, Schmandefare's conduct does not amount to trafficking, as one of the
objective elements required by sexual slavery is not met.
2. Schmandefare's Conduct does not Meet the Contextual Elements of
Sexual Slavery.
The contextual elements of a crime against humanity exclude isolated
random acts from this category, since conduct must be part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population,0 pursuant to a State or
organizational policy to commit such an attack.8' Absent State policy, the crime
must be linked to the policy of an organization with State-like characteristics
(e.g., control over territory or defacto authority).82 The instigation or direction
by such an organization is what makes the act a crime against humanity,8" and
excludes acts of individuals acting on their own initiative pursuant to their own
criminal plan.84 Schmandefare, as CEO and founder of the Schmandefare
Company, which has no ties to any government or public agency, was acting
78. Elements of Crimes, supra note 77, at art. 7(l)(g)-2, at note 18.
79. 1 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, U.N. GAOR 55/25, Annex H, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A 45/49 (2001), art. 3(a); Council
Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, July 19, 2002 O.J. (629/JHA), art. 1(a)(b).
80. ICC, supra note 21, at art. 7(2)(a); Elements of Crimes, supra note 77, at art. 7, Introduction,
3; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC Commentary, U.N. Doc.
A/51/I0/Corr.l (1996), art. 18, 93.
81. K.H.W. v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R., Loycaides Concurring Op. (2001); Regina v. Finta, 28 CR
4th 265 (1994); Touvier, Cass. Crim. (1992); Prosecutor v. Menten, Jan. 13, 1981, 75 I.L.R. 362, 362-63
(1982).
82. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Jan. 14, 2000, No. IT-95-16-T, 552; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2,
1995, No. IT-94-1-T 654, CASSESSE, supra note 3, at 250-51; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 275 (1999).
83. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2 1995, Appeal, No. IT-94-1-T n 654-55; Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
May 21, 1999, No. ICTR-95-1-T, U1 125-26; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, supra note 80; Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Apr. 8, 2003, IT-94-2, 26.
84. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 80, at art. 18; Slye,
Apartheid as a Crime against Humanity: A Submission to the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, MICH. J. INT'L L. 284 (1999); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307, (2000).
Distinguished Brief
pursuant to his own initiative. Indeed, it has not been disputed that he was
responsible for organizing the recruitment and transportation of women from
Cascadia to Annolay for employment in brothels. Moreover, the Schmandefare
Company does not posses any State-like characteristics, and thus he could not
be acting pursuant to the required organizational or State policy. Consequently,
Schmandefare clearly was not under the control or instigation of a State or
organization, which leaves out the possibility that he was acting pursuant to the
required policy.
Additionally, the attack must be directed against a civilian population
(individuals are victimized because of their membership to a targeted
population). The Schmandefare Company owned a large number of brothels
prior to the Cascadian women's arrival, which means that the women working
there were not only Cascadian. It follows that the women were not "victimized"
specifically because they were Cascadian, hence this requirement is not met.
Finally, the mens rea requirement is not met because, if as stated supra,
Schmandefare's acts were not part of a widespread or systematic attack, it
follows that he did not intend his acts to be of said nature. In sum, the elements
of a prima facie case of the crime against humanity of sexual slavery are miss-
ing, thus, prima facie no crime subject to universal jurisdiction has been
committed.
C. In The Further Alternative, Reston Is Banned From Exercising Universal
Jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction is the most exceptional basis for jurisdiction, 6 used
as an auxiliary form of jurisdiction in conjunction with other bases of
jurisdiction, 7 and only when the forum State has custody over the offender.88
As evidenced by State practice, States must rely on treaties when asserting juris-
diction based on universality,89 applying conventional rules regarding crimes of
85. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Nov. 29, 2002, No. 1T-98-32-T, 33; Prossecutor v. Kunarac, Feb. 22,
2001, No. IT - 96-23-T & IT-96-23/l-T 421; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Feb. 26, 2001, No. IT-95-14/2-T, 178;
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Oct. 2 1995, No. IT-94-1-T 644.
86. BENAVIDES, supra note 71, at 58; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor International
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (2001); Scottish
Parliament Information Center, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Universal Jurisdiction,
RNOI/83, at 5 (2001).
87. Att'y Gen. of the Gov't. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.LR. 26 11 (The Individual in Int'l Law
1968); Case 19/47, Spain Nat'l App. Ct. (1998); Case 1/98, Spain Nat'l App. Ct. (1998).
88. Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for all Nations Against
International Crime, 9 MSUJ-DCL J. INT'L L. 4 (2000); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case
for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Madeline H. Morris eds. 1996).
89. Prosecutor v. Djajic (Bravarian High Ct. 1997), May 23, 1997; Prosecutor v. Jorgic (Dusselforf
High Ct. 1997) Sept. 26, 1997; Pinochet, Tribunal de Premihre Instance de Bruxelles, No. X96-32.491 PF,
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terrorism, drug trafficking, torture, etc. 9° Hence, since Reston is not a party to
any convention which allows universal jurisdiction, it must rely on custom.
However, the state of the law does not evidence any consensus supporting
the notion that crimes against international law should be justiciable in national
courts on grounds of universality. 9' On the contrary, according to Amnesty
International, a passionate advocate of universal jurisdiction, merely a dozen
States have asserted universal jurisdiction.92 Such scant practice cannot amount
to customary law, as evidenced today more than ever by the stand of several ICJ
justices, who very recently expressly denied said customary status in the Arrest
Warrant Case. Thus, Reston is banned from exercising universal jurisdiction.
In any case, Reston's assertion of universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare
breaches international law.
1. A Trial In Absentia would Breach International Law.
Trials in absentia are normally forbidden. 93 Indeed, although most States
have prescribed laws against war crimes or crimes against humanity,94 until
2002 only five allowed trials in absentia.95 Moreover, the rejection of trials in
absentia is clearly evidenced by States' accord not to include this possibility
under the ICC Statute. Also, even perpetrators of the most serious international
crimes have been afforded the right to be present at trial,96 further evidencing
a general rejection of trials in absentia.
Judgment of the Ct. of Cass. (Chambre Criminelle 1998).
90. Int'l Conv. against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV),
34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at art, 5, 8, U.N. Doc. A/34/146; International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 9. 1998, at art. 6, U.N. Doc. A152/653 (1998); Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), art. 4, available at
http://www.ukcia.orgpolawllawlibrary/conventionagainstillicittraffic 1988.html. (last visited Sept. 23, 2003);
Convention against Torture, supra note 36, at art. 5.
91. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate et. al., 2000 1 A.C. 61, 79; SHAW,
supra note 54, at 411; CASSESE, supra note 3, at 262; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,
(Demo. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 182 6-7 (December 8) (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures).
92. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction [hereinafter Al Universal Juris.], available at
http://web.amnesty.orglweb/web.nsflprintlint-jus-uj. (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
93. Lawyers' Committee for Hum. Rts, Universal Juris. 9 (2002); Al, Universal Juris., I.O.R.
53/003/2001 (2001); Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioning of the LC.T.Y. and the LC.T.R., U.N. Doc. A154/634 I 10-11 (1999).
94. Demo. Rep. of the Congo, I.C.J. 182 1 8; Al Universal Juris. supra note 92, at ch. 2.
95. Bol: Penal Code, art. 1(7); Burundi: Dbcret-Loi No. 1/6, 4 April 1981, art. 4; El Sal: Penal
Code 1998, art. 10; Peru: Penal Code 1998, art. 2(5); Switz: Code Pnal Militaire Suisse.
96. Prosecutor v. Djajic (Bravarian High Ct. 1997) May 23, 1997; Pros. v. Akayesu, Sept. 2, 1998,
No. ICTR-96-4-T 608 ; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Dec. 10, 1998, No. IT-95-17/1-T 160; Prosecutor v.
Bla[ki], Mar. 3, 2000, No. IT-95-14-T 166.
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Reston may argue that the Lotus Case supports the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia, based on the dicta that, unless conduct is expressly
prohibited by international law, it is permitted.97 However, since in Lotus the
acts occurred at high seas, assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants did not
conflict with the territorial jurisdiction of any State. In contrast, Reston's
assertion of jurisdiction over Schmandefare would conflict with Annolay's
territorial jurisdiction. Hence, based on such distinguishing features, and on the
fact that a cloud of doubt continues to hang over Lotus,98 its invocation is
dubious at best. Accordingly, Reston's intention to prosecute Schmandefare in
absentia contradicts international law.
2. A Trial In Absentia would Breach Schmandefare's Right to Due Process.
A State's power to exercise universal jurisdiction requires that the accused
be present at trial and the observance of international due process norms.99 The
right to due process has acquired customary status, as derives from its
recognition in human rights instruments,"° suggesting a pattern of State
practice. Opinio juris follows from its inclusion in most States' national
legislation,'0 ' and application by international and national tribunals.' °
Moreover, even if trials in absentia may be performed under exceptionally
justified reasons, °3 the accused must be sufficiently informed of proceedings,
and he must voluntarily have waived his right to be present,' °4 none of which
97. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 10 at 4 (Sept. 1927) (Judgment No. 9),
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/cases/lotuslaw.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
98. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 77
(Clarendon Press - Oxford 1994).
99. SCHACTER, supra note 3, at 270; PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION,
Principles 1(2), 1(4) (Macedo ed. 2001).
100. Universal Declaration of Hum. Rt., G.A. Res. 217 A (LII), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
art. 10 (1948); ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 14; The Eur. Cony. for the Protection of Hum. Rts. and
Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8 entered into
force Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 197 1, Jan. 1, 1990, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 6; American Convention of Human
Rights, November 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1970, O.A.S.T.S. 4 No 36 at 1, O.A.C. off. Rec.
OEA/Ser. A16, 1144 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter AMCHR], art. 8; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's
Rights (1986), art. 7.
101. Const. Arg.., sect. 18; Can: Const., art. 4 §7; Chile: Const., art 19; PRC: Const., art 8(1);
Colom: Const., art. 28; Ecuador: Const., art. 24; Mex: Const., art. 18; Nor: Const., art. 9; S. Afr.: Const.,
art. 12(l)(a); Spain: Const., art. 17; Venez: Const., art. 47.
102. Reid v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 356/1989 (1993); Maxwell v. U.K., Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1994); U.S. (B.E. Chattin) v. Mex., US-Mex Cl. Comm. (1927); Lala v. Neth, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
103. U.N. H.C.R., Gral. Comm., 11 (1984), art. 13, 14; Justice in the Balance: Recommendations
for an Independent and Effective International Criminal Court, Comment to art. 63[56], HUM. RTS. WATCH
(1998).
104. Mbenge v. Zaire, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 16/1977, Supp. No. 40, Sept. 8, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/38/40 at 134 (1983); Conteris v. Uruguay, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 139/1983, Supp. No. 40,
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has happened here. Indeed, Reston has a priori voiced its intention to try
Schmandefare in absentia even before proper notice was issued. Therefore, he
was not given the opportunity to be present or to waive such right; hence a trial
in absentia would breach Schmandefare's due process rights.
3. Reston' s Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Breaches the Principle of
Good Faith.
In exercising its right to assert universal jurisdiction, a State must act in
good faith, 05 a principle that controls the exercise of rights by States.' 6 Facts
show that Reston's assertion of jurisdiction over Schmandefare is retaliatory to
Annolay's purpose of seeking reparation for the war victims, since a decision
to exercise universal jurisdiction must be based on legal considerations, not
political interference.l"7 The Restonian Min. of Justice expressed his intention
to try Schmandefare the same day that he received a memorandum from
President Raskolnikov stating: "Annolay's President challenges the conduct of
Restonian militiamen (...), but at the same time, (...) fails to protect the human
rights of women in her own country(...). Please have your Department
investigate this." Clearly, this statement was not based on legal considerations,
and the Court should dismiss Reston's bad faith claim for universal jurisdiction.
D. The Court Should Award Declaratory Relief
This Court has awarded declaratory judgments establishing obligations on
States to act in certain ways, and providing detailed guidance on their future
conduct.0 8 Accordingly, Annolay requests the Court to declare that Reston is
not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare.
Annolay has not breached any international legal obligations deriving from the
alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in Annolay, and in
any event, Reston has no standing to enforce any such obligations.
U.N. Doc. A/40/40 at 196 (1985); Colozza v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (1985); Wolf v. Panama, ImIRL 17,
Mar. 26, 1992, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 289/1988 (1992).
105. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (5th ed. 1999).
106. U.N. CHARTER, art (2)(1) (1945); CHENG, supra note 42, at 121; Bassiouni, supra note 86, at
87.
107. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 14 PRINCIPLES ON THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, I.O.R. 53/01/99, Prin. 8; PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Commentary
43 (2001).
108. Haya de la Tone, (Colom. v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 82; Temple of Preah Vihear, (Camb. v.
Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6.
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A. Reston Lacks Standing To Bring This Claim Before The Court.
Annolay will first deal with the issue of locus standi, since States must
raise their objections to admissibility in a timely manner (i.e., at the earliest
stages of the case) lest it be presumed that they have tacitly waived such an
objection.'" As established supra, a State other than the injured State can
invoke another State's responsibility for breaches of obligations erga omnes."°
In this case, obligations regarding trafficking in women have not acquired erga
omnes status. Indeed, erga omnes obligations are defined as peremptory norms
recognized as such by the international community as a whole,"' which is not
the case of obligations on trafficking, due to lack of international consensus as
to a definition of trafficking and the varying practice and opinio juris of
States. " 2 Hence, Reston has no standing to bring this claim.
Reston may then try to prove that trafficking breaches the erga omnes
prohibition against slavery. However, that idea is not widely accepted, since
States consider trafficking to be a prohibited, yet distinct practice from
slavery," 3 as derives from the treatment of trafficking as a distinct crime in
specialized conventions.1 4 At most, trafficking may be a contemporary form
of slavery, not "slavery" as originally understood (i.e., the status of persons over
whom powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised)," 5 and there is
no evidence that the erga omnes status of slavery extends to its contemporary
forms, since their substantive content has not been identified.' 16 Thus, Reston's
attempt to base it locus standi on a supposed erga omnes breach through
trafficking in women is, at the very least, highly questionable.
109. Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. 240 IN 31-36; Velazquez
Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R., U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 88; Loizidou v. Turk., Eur. Ct. H.R. t42-
45 (1995).
110. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 3,
at art. 48(l)(b); Barcelona Traction, (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3; South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J Jessup
separate opinion.; Case Concerning East Timor, (Port. v. Aus.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 209-16 (June 30).
111. VCLT, supra note 51, at art. 53.
112. U.N. Secretary General Report on Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. 9/50/369, at para.
23 [hereinafter Trafficking in Women and Girls]; Trafficking in Women and Girls, 57th Sess., Item 104, U.N.
Doc. A/57/170, at para. 2; Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children
for Prostitution: Making it Live up to its Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 219 (1997); Nora v.
Demleitner, Forced Prostitution: Naming an International Offense, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 163 (1994).
113. A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition of
Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303, 308-09 (1999);
Michelle 0. P. Dunbar, Comment, The Past, Present, and Future of International Trafficking in Women for
Prostitution, 8 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 116 (1999-2000).
114. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), at art. 6;
Trafficking Convention (1951), at art. 1.
115. Slavery Convention , 60 L.N.T.S. 253, entered into force March 9, 1927, at art. 1.
116. Dunbar, supra note 113, at 116; Rassam, supra note 113, at 308.
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B. Alternatively, Annolay Has Not Breached Obligations Regarding The
Treatment of Cascadian Women.
1. Reston Cannot Enforce Any Obligation Upon Annolay.
Reston will argue that the conventional "obligation to prevent, prosecute
and punish trafficking in women""' 7 is customary. However, this is not so, as
derives from these facts: (i) the most recent treaty on trafficking has been
ratified by only 8 States; 18 (ii) the Trafficking Convention has been ratified
only by one third of States in over 50 years;" 9 and (iii) until very recently, there
was no consensus on the definition of trafficking, 2 ' which has today not been
adopted by the majority of States.12' Moreover, differences in State practice and
opinio juris on this subject 22 remove any possibility of customary status. On
the contrary, State practice shows that: (i) persistent patterns of trafficking in
women are common around the world, both into developed countries (e.g., in
the US 50,000 trafficked women), 123 and underdeveloped countries (e.g., India
117. Convention against Trafficking, supra note 114, at art. 1, 2, 16; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supra note 79, at art. 2(a); Women's Convention, supra note 114, at art.
6.
118. Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. A/57/170, supra note 112, at 2.
119. Demleitner, supra note 112, at 172; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, March 21, 1950, U.N. GA Res. 317 (IV), 96 U.N. T.S.
271 (entered into force on July 25, 1951, in acc. with art. 24), available at http://www.unhchr/htmllmenu3/b/
treatylla.htm. (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
120. Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. 9/50/369, supra note, 112 at para. 23; OWED
Justice, V. International Legal Standards on Trafficking in Women: Thai Women Trafficked into Debt
Bondage in Japan, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/j apan/5-int-
stand.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); Robyn Emerton, Tracking of Women into Hong Kong for the Purpose
of Prostitution, U.H.K. 2 (2000).
121. Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.N. Doc. A/51/170, supra note 112, at 2; U.N. G.A., Special
Session on Children, Statement by Vincent McClean, Representative, U.N. Office for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention, to the Committee of the Whole (2002).
122. Farrior, supra note 112, at 219; Lois Chiang, Trafficking in Women in I WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 357 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., Transnational Pub.
1999); See generally U.N. ESCOR, Report on Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and
Human Trafficking, Substantive Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. E/2002/68/Add. 1 (2002); Trafficking in Women and
Girls, U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, U.N. Doc.
EGM/TRAF/2002/Rep. 1 at 6 (2002).
123. Kathryn E. Nelson, Comment, Sex Trafficking and Forced Prostitution: Comprehensive New
Legal Approaches, 24 HouS. J. INT'L L. 551, 554 (2002); Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of
Trafficking: An American Frame Work, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L J. 29, 30 (2001); Sabrina FRve &
Christina Finzel, Recent Development, Trafficking of People, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 280 (2001); Amy
O'Neill Richard, International Trafficking of Women into the U.S.: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery
and Organized Crime, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/traffic/report
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and Thailand); 24 and (ii) the culprits of this practice are rarely punished.
Indeed, trafficking and prostitution of women are today a sad but extremely
common reality. Hence, customary law does not provide Reston any grounds
for enforcing the obligation to prevent and punish trafficking upon Annolay.
2. Alternatively, Annolay Complied with its Due Diligence Obligation.
Reston cannot argue that Annolay was insufficiently diligent in dealing
with the matter of the Cascadian women since, as established supra, State
obligations are not clear regarding trafficking in women, hence it is unrealistic
to hold States legally responsible for lack of due diligence. 21 In any case,
Annolay created a blue-ribbon panel to look into the matter merely two weeks
after the ILSA report was published, which evidences the State's diligence on
the matter. These panels have been created all over the world to resolve human
rights violations, 26 such as in Argentina. 27  A blue-ribbon panel expedites
results since proceedings need not follow rigid procedures, and their ability to
gather evidence is enhanced.' Moreover, although the panel has taken over a
year to produce results, this is a reasonable period of time, since trafficking is
an extremely complex problem.129 Thus, Annolay has been diligent in dealing
with this matter.
.pdf. (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
124. Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections against Trafficking
Forced Labor Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L REV. 55 (2001); A Modern Form of
Slavery: Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (1993),
available at http:lwww.hrw.org/reportsll993/thailandL. (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
125. Chiang, supra note 122, at 356.
126. Gregory Jowdy, Note, Truth Commissions in El Salvador United States Institute of Peace. Truth
Commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Proposal for Truth in Guatemala, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
285,307 (1997); See generally Commissions Around the World, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, avail-
able at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003); See generally A Culture of Recon-
ciliation in Africa: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission - Transformative Justice, the
Restoration of Dignity and Reconciliation, available at http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/lax.pdf. (last visited Oct. 4,
2003).
127. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 11, at 234-35.
128. Angelika Schlunck, Contributor, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 415, 416-17 (1998); Mark Vasallo, Comment, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: General
Considerations and a Critical Comparison of the Commissions of Chile and El Salvador, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 153, 160 (2002).
129. U.N. H.C.H.R., Statement to the Asia-Pacific Symposium on Trafficking in Persons, Tokyo
(2000); See generally, Memorandum of Concern: Trafficking of Migrant Women for Forced Prostitution in
Greece, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (July 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/greece/greece-memo-all.pdf. (last visited Oct. 10, 2003); Laurie
Hauber, The Trafficking of Women for Prostitution: A Growing Problem Within the European Union, 21 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 185 (1998).
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C. The Court Should Provide Declaratory Relief.
Declaratory judgments provide satisfaction for breaches of international
law, 130 and have been willingly granted by this Court and its predecessor.'13
Accordingly, Annolay requests that this Court award a declaratory judgment
stating that it has not breached its international obligations deriving from the
alleged treatment of Cascadian women working in brothels in Annolay.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Annolay respectfully requests that the Court: DECLARE that Reston has
breached its international obligations with respect to the rape victims now
resident in Annolay and ORDER payment of damages to be distributed to those
victims; DECLARE that Reston has breached its international obligations with
respect to the bribes exacted from Annolaysian citizens, and ORDER payment
of restitution in the amount of the bribes; DECLARE that Reston is not entitled
to exercise universal jurisdiction over Schmandefare; and DECLARE that Reston
has no standing to raise a claim regarding the treatment of Cascadian women
working in brothels in Annolay, and that, in any event, Annolay has not
breached any international legal obligations in that respect.
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